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SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES AND ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS 
IN THE GROWTH OF THE PARIS AREA 
Guy Burgel 
The economic and social evolution of the le -de -France (the Seine river basin around 
Paris) cannot be separated either from the deepseated tendencies of urban evolution in the 
world's greatest metropolitan areas， nor from the voluntarist policies which carry them along， 
accompany them or combat their effects， according to the degree of confidence and 
effectiveness one grants to urban planning documents and normative actions. 1t would be just 
as illusory to deny the autonomy and thus the decision -making power of the economic and 
demographic actors -businesses and households -as it would be dangerous to abandon 
ourselves to a “laissez -faire" attitude， which might， inthe long run endanger the main social 
and political balances of the region and consequently its credibility and its efficiency in 
international competition. In these mechanisms of constraint， often contradictory， of which the 
resultant can only be a narrow crest -line， which does not exclude巴itherthe ambition of 
a project or the solidness of its realization， we must show the forces in action in their 
continuity and their breaks， and the regional and national stakes which underlie the logic 
of action and intervention in the French capital. But it is just as indispensable to set a clear 
limit analyses and approaches of the university professor or researcher， who has been promoted 
to the rank of expert， and the forms of his propositions and convictions which come from 
his C1V1C commitment， even though illuminated by privileged professional information. For the 
choices are political before being technical and spatial， and as such， belong， ina democratic 
regime， to al， whether citizens， associations， political parties or elected officials. At the very 
most， itis advisable to trace the possible options and alternatives. As long as we do not 
impose as a prerequisite forms demanded in the name of some so -called scientific rigour 
or ideological fidelity. Our times are less than ever times of certainties and dogmatic respect 
for the letter of the law. Furthermore， nothing is ineluctable. But it is when we confuse 
different spheres that we risk losing everything and falling into the disaster scenarios that 
we wish to avoid. 
Universite de Paris X -Nanterre 
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1 -CONTINUITY AND BREAIくS
Our present time， with its intense economic mutations -which are more than a severe 
passing crisis -brings us to question about th巴 validityof geographical systems born of a 
conjuncture of continuous regular growth of individual income and collective wealth. Not only 
have the best established urban theories been unable to resist the test of economic and 
demographic reversals， but the facts themselves， attested to by decades of continuity give the 
impression of becoming shaky and being called into question. It is in our mental structures 
that it is the most difficult to put things in order and loosen rigidity. This is the case for 
the Geography of activity localization and the evolution of the relationship between the capital 
and the rest of the country. The whole post -war generation， which had liv巴daccording to 
the image -and the reality -of Paris surrounded by the French desert， was able to bring 
about the triumph of its decentralization policies， at the very moment in the 1950's and 1960' 
s， when the normal incline of technologies and m巴ntalitieswas leading to a spread of growth. 
Nowadays， we stil think and live in terms of the dispersion and diffusion of initiatives， 
consumption and life -styles， at a time when new centralities are in gestation. This 
contradiction between temporalities and periodicities leads beyond the facts， which are widely 
known， to an analysis of tendencies in terms of continuity and breaks， and to an attempt 
to discover in the mass of statistics， the d巴viantdata， that which only reorients the system 
in place or which augurs more profoundly for a new order of things. 
1) Four Fundamental Tendencies 
Demographic slow -down 
A few outstanding characteristics will be recalled here to enable us to draw a picture of 
the French c旦pital and its surrounding area， which， though a caricature， resembles it 
nonetheless. The first of these is unquestionably a demographic slow -down， which can be 
seen in al the available staitistics1 In the space of 10 years， from January 1st， 1977 to January 
1st， 1986， the le -d巴-France gained less than 300000 inhabitants， going from 9912000 
residents to 10206000. However， the first results of the 1990 census show a certain acceleration 
of Paris demographic growth with a net gain of almost 600000 inhabitants between 1982 
and 1990. 
The lesson of the last two decades has been that a century and a half of unique economic 
and demographic concentration has resulted in a multipolarisation of French geographical space. 
The possible reorientation of these structural rev巴rsalsis less to be found in the simpl巴
statistical evolution of numbers (increase in population or in the number of people active) 
than in the increasing flexibility of the relationship that an area's inhabitants have with their 
place of residence or their jobs. Localized enumeration is no longer th巴 bestindicator of urban 
space. 
1 Tableaux economiques de l'Ile -de -France， edition 1986， Paris ， 1 N. S. E. E. ， 1987. 
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Geographical outward movement 
Furthermore， this stagnation in the Paris area at about 1/6 of the national population is 
accompanied by slow and continous internal modifications in the localization of people and 
their activities. Geographical outward movement (from centre to suburbs) is certainly the key 
term here. 
Concomittantly and correlatively， there is a constant progression and rejuvenation of 
developed space in the outlying areas， in spite of the renovation projects in city centres. 
The development of the service sector 
At the same time， profound changes in the economic apparatus were being made. These 
can be summed up by the terms “de -industrialization"，“development of the service sector" 
and “decline of labour -based industri白Injust the one intercensal period from 1975 to 
1982， which is far from covering the most rapid transformations， industry again lost more 
than 200000 employees in the Ile -de -France， going from 36. 2 % to 30. 6 % of the total 
active population (the national average is 34%)， while the service sector gained almost 300000 
jobs， exceeding the distribution for France as a whole by more than ten points in 1982 (68 
% of the total active population in th巴Ile-de -France as opposed to 57. 7 % in the country 
as a wholeL This means that here again， the long -range movement for purifying and refining 
activities to the advantage of administration and economic high command， and to the detriment 
of production as such was continued and deepened. Obviously one finds effects of this long 
economic history in the social structuring of this area that is both capital and region. In 1982， 
executives and members of the intellectual professions represented 15 % of those active in 
the le -de -France， that is ， nearly five points above the national average， and there were 
almost twice as many workers in France as a whole (44 %) as in the Paris area (24 %). In 
spite of the slow movements of standardization and homogenization of life -styles and social 
stratifications， the gap between Paris and the rest of France stil exists. 
Innovation 
This apparent contradiction comes from the fact -and this will be the fourth tendency to 
be distinguished -that the French capital has always had an innovativ巴 effect，both social 
and economic， inthe process of evolution in life -styles and systems of production. Of course， 
it is always defficult to bring together figures on the economic aspects of this phenomenon. 
But it is easier to show its role as a precursor and the part it plays as a premonition of 
the mechanisms at work behind the events of civilization. We know that the 1982 census 
threw a bright light， at least insofar as public opinion was concerned， on “single -parent 
families". They represent， infact， nearly one tenth of the total number of families in the city 
of Paris (9. 6 %)， 7. 9 % in the le -de -France， and only 6. 3 % in the country as a whole. 
This is more than a simple demographic curiosity in the evolution of morals. We have here 
a sign that Paris retains its specificity. In the societies and spaces that the information and 
transportation revolution daily helps make more standardized and interdependent， the pre 
eminence of a few c巴ntralplaces continues， by th巴 suddenappear巴ncesof something new， 
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to differentiate between geographical localizations. 
2) Provocative Assertions or Impertinent Observations 
The recovery of employment 
But now， a few recent events have somewhat upset these well worked out schemes. There 
is， first of al， as seen through the UNEDIC' series， analyzed between 1981 and 1984， an 
indication of much more dynamic activity and employment in the Ile -de -France region 
than the overall assessments， which were always n巴gativeand therefore port色ndeddisaster， 
would show. 
The return of centrality 
What is most surprising is that this economic dynamism concerns city centre locations as 
well as those in the outskirts， even though the balances are stil more favourable to the 
outlying suburbs (table n 0 1). 
This mass effect continues to be felt therefore， inan impressive way， since the city of Paris， 
with one fifth of the region's active population， has a concentration of much more than one 
third of the jo bs that have appeared in the newly created establishments in the private sector. 
Table n 0 1 
Assessment of the active personnel 
in the establishments created or liquidated 
in the private sector from 31 Dec. 1981 to 31 Dec. 1984 
(in thousands of jobs). 
Paris 
Inner departements 
Outlying departments 
Entire le -de -Franc巴
Creations 
183 (37%) 
174 (36%) 
130 (27%) 
487 (100%) 
2 Organisation which collect management's contributions. 
Liquidations 
209 (39 %) 
192 (36 %) 
132 (25 %) 
533 (100%) 
Balances 
-26 (56 %) 
18 (39 %) 
- 2 (5 %) 
-45 (100 %) 
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The preservation of ordinary activities 
In any case， the decline of industry in Paris is much more diversified than we are generally 
led to believe. 
The de -industrialization of Paris thus does not seem to be the result of a univocal process， 
nor can it be subject to a general study. 
Mastery of this phenomenon is much more sector -based than geographical; the Ile -de -
France region has not been inexorably struck by a generalized decline， nor are its outlying 
areas any better off in the general misfortune. 
On the whole， itis true that the Ile -de -France region is continuing its de -industrialization， 
but especially， as in al the world's capitals， a dual society is emerging which provides not 
only “high -tech" jobs， but also service jobs which require litle or no qualification. In Paris， 
as in New york， there are more and more industrial activities which one might tend to consider 
as being part of a peri -industrialization which is maintained or reestablished in the central 
zones of the urban area (table n 0 2). 
Table n 0 2 
Assessment of the active personnel 
in the industrial establishments 
of the private sector from 31 Dec. 1981 to 31 Dec. 1984 
(increases and decreases in personnel， 
creations and liquidations of establishments) 
(in thousands of jobs) 
Equipement industries 
Standard consumer 
goods industries 
Paris -7.5 (17 %) -6.5 (50 %) 
Inner departments -27.0 (61 %) -6.5 (50%) 
Outlying departments -9.5 (22 %) O 
Entire Ile -de -France -44.0 (100 %) 13.0 (100 %) 
The large and the small 
Finally， ifwe continue down the path of iconoclasm， we will also have to go back over 
the interest politicians and observers bring to bear， after the experience of the United States， 
on activity units， ifnot businesses， of small size. “Small is beautiful" ; inanother words， a 
reduction to the smallest component part as well as dispersion may be the real way out of 
the present crisis， just as concentration was the corollary of growth. The observations made 
show that we must at least soften our enthusiasm (table n 0 3) 
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Table n 0 3 
“Apparent balances" of active personnel in the establishments of the private sector 
from 31 Dec. 1981 to 31 Dec. 1984 
according to the size of the establishment. 
(increases and decreases in personn巴1，
creation and liquidations of establishments) 
(in thousands of jobs) 
Establishments with less 
than 10 salaried employees 
Establishm巴ntswith more 
than 200 salaried employees 
Paris 
Inner departments 
Outlying departments 
Entire Ile -de -France 
-38 
26 
-9 
-73 
I -OUESTIONS AND CONSEOUENCIES. 
+11 
-7 
+4 
The problem of the importance of these deviant characteristics in modifying the overall 
significance of Paris space stil remains， as does that of their specificity in appreciating the 
differential evolution of Paris in relation to th巴 wholeof France. 
1) The different levels in the city 
Centre and outskirts 
The first hypothesis is the return of centra1ity thanks to the current crisis. The years of 
growth were synonymous and concomitant， everywhere and at al levels， with the diffusion 
and dispersion of economic initiative， of consumption and income， and finally of the 1ifestyles 
in an urban and industrial society. A deep -seated logic and voluntarist policies in the matter 
of national and regional development were objectively allied in these effects of homogenization 
of space and people. When you have al the jam you want， it's easy to spread it ov巴rthe 
whole piece of bread. Going from an economy of satisfying needs to an economy of competition 
-competition between the developed countries and their capitals， competition b巴tweenregions， 
competition between cities， and competition between towns in the urban area -we once again 
give meaning to the differ巴ntiationbetween places， to the inequality of their images， to their 
capacity for focusing information， communications and decisions， in short， to the power to 
create and profit from centrality. 
This new historical mutation of economies and societies makes the formulas for conversion 
or success (what is good for one is not necessarily good for another， at the risk of losing 
one's own competitiveness) difficult to apply and renders obsolete the prediction of futurologists 
who pr巴viouslyforetold the generalized dilution of urban centralities into a tele -computerized 
civilization. What has happened is quite the opposite3 • In Paris， as well as in New York， the 
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acceleration of technological and cultural transformations is reinforcing the importance of the 
world's metropolitan areas， and inside each of them， a few nodal points， whether they be 
traditional (such as th巴 Champs-Elyse es)， recent parallel developments (Iike La Defense) or 
creations in the outlying ar巴as(the new towns. to the west of Paris， and first of al， Saint 
Quentin -en -Yvelines). 
The result of al this is that there can no longer be any national or regional development 
which can be called redistributive. Th巴 problemis no longer the opposition between Paris 
and the provinces -Paris and the French desert -if one considers the national level， nor is 
it that of creating metropolitan areas which count巴rbalanceParis. The problem is to learn 
whether we will have in France， after al， areas which are likely to attract sufficient power 
for the accumulation of wealth. And it is for this reason that， on al levels， the spatial and 
functional stakes have radically changed. Henceforth， the question is less one of redistributing 
the wealth， but of being able to preserve it and to continue to accumulate it. 
The Local Level and the Worldwide Level 
Thus the transforinations of urban centrality lead to a paradoxical conception of the 
evolution of western cities -at least of very large cities -in terms of an ambiguous materiality. 
On the one hand， built -up space is increasing in surface and in height; on the other， the 
weight of demography and even economic functionality remains stable. 
But these revolutions are only possible because those who play the non一institutionalroles 
in the city -inhabitants and businesses -transform their scale of valorizations of the area 
themselves. Our contemporary societies seem torn between privileged attachments to things 
both local and distant. Everything is done as though the intermediate levels between one's 
dwelling and the neighborhood， on the one hand， and the nation and the world on the other， 
had simply been rubbed out. The towns， especially if they are large or included in an urban 
development， the whole urban area itself and the region， lose their power to attract in the 
collective imagination. Thus the discontinuities of space already noticed on the plane of 
economic polarization are confirmed on the level of public consciousness. 
This double adherence to both what is local and what is distant， which is felt and acted 
upon by social and economic players， explains why urban competition is played and won， 
both on the concrete ground of prestige urbanistic realizations， which associate cultural and 
leisur巴 activitiesand the media with architectural aspects (cf. the “Arche de La De fense")， 
and on the continuous itinerant representation of the interests and the image of the city. 
A city's form and the organization of society and economy are more than ever interdependant 
sides of the same whole. 
3. cf. Guy Burgel:“L"informatique， nouvel ordre spatial ou nouvelle information ge ographique， Saga， 
n 0 2， 1989. (Computor science， a new spatial order or neW geographical information ) 
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2) Spaces and Societies 
New social stratifications 
These new dimensions in the geography of Paris are more social than truly spatial， insofar 
as it is much more trasformed social stratifications which are developing， owing to a cnS1S 
or to mutations， which， for the sake of convenience， are ca11ed economic. Growth， here again， 
had consolidated "new urban social levels"， from employees to top executives， ina constant 
numerical progression， divided by income but united by the same respect for diplomas and 
merit and the wish to aspire to， ifnot attain a1 of the consumer possibilities of an industrial 
society. On the contrary， recent years have seen a fragmenting of this unity into at least 
two types of segmentation. On the one hand， those I will ca11 the “mobile elite" (top 
management executiv巴sin both the pu blic and private sectors， providers of information and 
top inte11ectuals) are bringing back urban centrality. On the other hand， the “吋techni日cians"
whether they be in production or in distribution， who are capable of understanding and 
applying these innovations， to draw profit from them in their prof巴ssionalor personal lives， 
contrast with those who submit to them， fear them or suffer from them. This break is 
progressively replacing the traditional opposition between the secondary sector and the tertiary 
sector， and between workers and employees. At least as an exploratory field， the Ile -de -
France provides a good ground for an advance study of these evolutions. 
New mobilities 
There is something else that is new. We have to live in contradictory urban spaces， inwhich 
the static and statistical immobility of the city， which no longer has anything to do with 
the rhythms of wi¥d growth of the years from 1955 to 1970， coincides with internal and 
interurban mobility which tends to stay the same， or even increase， whatever may be the 
principal place of residence of urban families. It is therefore a d巴lusion，even more so in 1990 
than in 1965， to think that one can convincingly bring closer together， in a lasting as well 
as a functional way， places of employment and places of residence. 
Activities and employment 
Finally， ifthe French capital has been abl巴 toget back a certain economic vigour and 
reaffirm its competitiveness， unemployment has progressed， here as everywhere else in the 80' 
s， even though its rise was almost stabilized in 1987. This deterioration is not only due to 
the structural consequenc巴sof th巴 increasein the potential active population by the entry 
of mor巴 youngpeople into the labour market. What connections of causality are there in 
modern societies between competitiveness， economic efficiency and underemployment? Or if 
we were to ask the question more bluntly， iswhat is good for activity necessarily good for 
employment? The answer we give to that question might explain the present difficulty in 
combining the resumption of growth with the maintenance of stringency and even of 
unemployment for the most impoverished， or of allowing in the same places the coexistence 
of the most prestigious capitals， the most advanced technology， the most securely established 
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wealth and the most abject despair. Here again， the evolution of employment in Paris would 
be a good introduction to serious thought on the whole question of the indispensible effort 
to be made for solidarity and the necessary imagination in the areas of professional and 
cultural training for citizens. Isn't this the only way to remain competitive and profit equitably 
from growth? 
m -THE OPTIONS FOR ACTION 
Once the facts have been established and questions outlined， the debate， we must remember， 
remains a political one， before being a choice of spatial options or opposing master plans. 
It is political on two accounts. First of al， b巴caus巴 itis a social problem. What can we do 
once wealth has been accumulated， to permit us to share it as equitably as possible among 
al the social strata of the population. The question is also political because these decisions 
imply an interaction between institutional actors -from the towns to the state -with its own 
rules of functioning. But it would be useful to recall the terms of the debate and the possible 
means of action open. 
1) Economic accumulation and imbalance 
The first point bears on the method and the nature of capitalist accumulation. There is 
no point in closing our eyes to the problem. The end of this century gives constant 
confirmation of the fact that you have to accum ulate wealth before you can redistribute it， 
and for accumulating， there is as yet nothing better than our liberal system. But we have 
known for a long time now， since de XIXth century in fact， that this accumulation cannot 
be accomplished without paying th巴 pricein two basic areas， those of spatial imbalance and 
social inequality. 
In applying this analysis to the Paris area， we al agree on two objectives: on the one hand， 
socisl levels， income， equipment and transport must be better balanced and better distributed; 
on the other， we must be economically efficient. And without trying to fix positions rigidly 
on irreducable bases， two courses app巴aropen : 
* that of those who state strongly， with tenacity and preClSlOn， that we must first bring 
the region into balance， this is a condition necessary for social justice. 
* that of those who maintain that we must first be economically efficient if we are to 
have anything to distribute， that we must accumulate so that we can endeavour to be just 
to the highest degree possible. 
2) The two disaster scenarios 
Beyond the choice of methods for achieving the best economic and social results possible 
for Paris， we can always elaborate the two disaster scenarios that must be avoided at al 
cost. Neither is spatial， for when it comes down to it， g巴ographersdo not really trust the 
explanation based on space， whether it be positive or negative. 
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The first scenario would be the penalization scenario. It would be a mistake to penalize 
Paris in favour of the provinces， on the pretext that there are more people in the provinces 
than in Paris， for this would be penalizing Paris to the detriment of France. 
The second disaster scenario would be to give free rein to the natural consequences of 
a liberal system of growth， or to let double -level urban societies and double -level spaces 
be set up， with their disparities in wealth， inconsumer goods and services， and mentalities. 
Between these two disaster scenarios， there is a narrow but essential path. It is of no use 
to lay it out with an old -fashioned volunatarism， of which al the experiments一inthe East 
as in the West -during periods of growth， crisis or recovery -have been seen to fail when 
they struck fundamental tendencies head on. It would be much better， in the name of a 
political objective -social equity， or， why not， democratic control of power -to act with 
determination， imagination and realism. 
3) Interdependence and a mixed economy 
From this point on the reflection suggested could be brought to bear on the double notion 
of interdep巴ndenceand a mix巴deconomy. The key ideas in this process should be 1 -not 
to penalize accumulation and 2 -to redistribute， thus becoming more interdependent. This may 
seem like wishful thinking， but if there is very litle likelihood of Paris becoming another 
Beirut， or even another New York， itis just possible that social and ethnic tensions and the 
difficulty in having a decent life might intensify and become intolerable， first of al， for the 
most impoverished， but also for the greatest number. Here again， the cure might prouve to 
be worse than the disease， ifserious thinking about the relationship tetween spaces and 
societies were insufficient or based on a rigid interventionism. One does not act on space 
by space， but on the mechanisms which govern it， develop it or correct it. 
W巴 cantake up again a quick analysis of the main questions which apply to the le -de 
France. The presence of poles of economic wealth and pockets of poverty in investments 
and initiative does not depend only， nor doubtless even mainly， on the setting up of zones 
of activity or even differential fiscal taxation of which the univocal effects have always been 
uncertain. It is often easy to dissuade， or even prohibit a decision to proceed with the creation 
of something， but it is more difficult to impose a positive localization for it. 
In the same way， ifal the experiments carried out over the last decade (cf. the Harlequin 
project in Grenoble) show that social integration cannot be legislated any more than ethnic 
mixing can， we have known for a long time the virtues of public education， improving the 
appearance of towns， and access to the ful rights of citizenship， which generate social fluidity 
and residential mobility， and we must find our way back to al of these things. 
They touch， by a spirit of imagination and experimentation， on al the consequences of a 
mixed society and economy in which France is engaged on a long -term basis. To illustrate 
this point by example of the university， the localization of a future Paris XN or XV is of 
less importance -on condition that there be a colse collaboration with the area as a whole 
-than knowing whether these new institutions will be given innovating structures， which 
would allow the combination of the public university's traditions of humanism and basic ideas 
Burgel : Social Consequences and Economic Constraints 187 
with the flexibility of management and adaptation of private universities. 
We must have the courage in these uncertain times， tomake audacious wages. Voluntarism 
and authoritarian spatial planification， under cover of rigour， take us back half a century. If 
we hope to win the fight against political， social and economic egoism， the time has come 
for creative imagination. 
